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COMMENTS
Income Taxation-A Pauper a Day Keeps the Taxaan Away:
Qualification of Hospitals as Charitable Institutions Under Sec-
tion 501(c) (3) of the IRC of 1954
Public policy is the aggregate of the "general principles by which a
government is guided in its management of public affairs. . "...- This
expression of concern for "the welfare or prosperity of the. . . commu-
nity" is found in our constitutions, statutes, judicial decisions, and
executive orders. Nowhere is public policy more purposely incorpo-
rated than in our revenue laws. While the Internal Revenue Code [IRC]3
is fundamentally oriented toward the collection of the tax revenues, the
tax laws also implement a myriad of goals having tenuous connection
with the financing of our government. One of these objectives is the
regulation of charities.
The national government does not directly prescribe laws regulat-
ing the establishment and operation of charities. This task is adminis-
tered by the individual states.4 Congress does indirectly control these
organizations, however, by granting substantial tax benefits upon their
compliance with its legislative directives. These benefits are in two
forms. First, charities that meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3)
of the IRC are exempted from taxation of their income.5 Secondly,
contributions to these qualifying charities are congressionally encour-
aged by allowing the donors to deduct them from their adjusted gross
income.0 By making the carrot so tasty, Congress avoids the necessity
of a stick.
Because of these tax concessions, it is economically desirable, if not
imperative, for hospitals to qualify as tax exempt organizations. Section
501(a) exempts organizations described in section 501(c)(3) from
1. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1317 (4th ed. 1951).
2. Id.
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
4. See generally 4 A. ScoTr, THE LAw OF TRUsTs §§ 348-403 (3d ed. 1967).
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(a) provides: "An organization described in
subsection (c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle
unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503."
6. Id. § 170.
1196 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
taxation on income related to its exempt purposes.7  To qualify under
the latter section, a hospital must meet the following requirements: (1)
it must be organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals; (2) no earnings of
the hospital may benefit any private shareholder or individual; and (3)
it must neither devote a substantial part of its activities toward influenc-
ing legislation nor engage in a political campaign.' Health care or-
ganizations are generally exempted as charitable institutions.9
ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL TESTS
The regulations have created organizational and operational tests
incorporating the above prescriptions. A hospital must meet both tests
in order to earn its exemption.10 The first standard requires the charity
to be organized exclusively for exempt functions. 1 This requirement
obligates the articles of organization to restrict the mission of the
organization to one or more of the exempt purposes specified in the
statute and to avoid any express authorization of substantial activities
not in furtherance of the exempt purposes.' 2 The term "articles of
incorporation" encompasses a trust instrument, a corporate charter, or
any other written document by which the organization is established."3
7. Id. § 501(a). For a discussion of the taxation of an organization's income that
is unrelated to its exempt purpose, see text accompanying notes 33-37, 39-42 infra.
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3). The subsection provides:
(c) List of exempt organizations-The following organizations are referred
to in subsection (a):
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, or-
ganized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to in-
fluence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including
the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf
of any candidate for public office.
9. See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 202. Of course, a teaching hospital
could also apply for exempt status as an educational organization, but the hospital itself
must provide the curriculum and instruction and not merely the facilities. Cf. Harding
Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1076 (6th Cir. 1974). Furthermore, the
exemption would cover only income resulting from its educational functions. Income
relating solely to the provision of health care would not be exempted.
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-l (a) (1) (1969).
11. Id. -1(b).12. Id. -l(b)(1)(i).
13. Id. -1(b)(2).
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The writing will comply with the regulations if it contains a verbatim
quotation of exempt purposes from the statute. A more detailed de-
scription of the objective and the manner of its attainment is also
acceptable."
An organization will fail the organizational test, however, if its
articles authorize substantial activities of a non-exempt nature, regard-
less of whether the articles restrict the aim of the institution to those
listed in the statute.' 5 Also, even though the actual functioning of the
charity is in pursuit of its exempt purpose, the test is not met if the
founding document permits substantial non-exempt functions.' 6 The
articles must also refrain from authorizing substantial involvement in the
influencing of legislation or participation in political campaignsY. In
addition, to prevent any noncharitable use of the assets of the organiza-
tion, the articles must dedicate the assets exclusively to charity by
providing that they be distributed for exempt purposes upon the dissolu-
tion of the organization. Under no circumstances may the assets be
distributed to any shareholders of the charity, as this event would allow
the inurement of retained earnings to a private individual.' 8
The second criterion for tax exempt status under section
501(c)(3) defines "operated exclusively" as engaged primarily in activ-
ities that promote charitable purposes. If more than an insubstantial
portion of the institution's work is in non-exempt areas, the test is not
met.' 9  Additionally, the standard does not allow the inurement of
earnings to the benefit of private persons. In this regard, there appears
to be no requirement of substantiality. If any earnings are available in
whole or in part for the benefit of private individuals, the organization is
not exclusively operated for charitable purposes."0 Furthermore, the
operational test denies an exemption to "action" organizations. These
are groups that devote a substantial part of their activities to influencing
legislation by propaganda or other means, or that intervene in any
political campaign on behalf of or against any candidate for office. 2 '
14. Id. -1(b)(1)(ii). In fact, a detailed statement of the projected activities of
the organization must also be submitted with its application for exemption. Id. -1(b)
(1)(v).
15. Id. -1C(b) (1) (fii).
16. Id. -1l(b) (I) (iv).
17. Id. -1 (b) (3).
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LIMITATIONS ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL TEST
As stated earlier, the organizational test is not met if the articles of
organization authorize non-charitable activities, although the actual op-
eration of the institution is restricted to a permitted purpose. Some
courts have shown a reluctance to enforce this regulation literally. In
John Danz Charitable Trust,2 2 for example, the Tax Court held a trust
exempt when the trust instrument specifically empowered the trustees to
engage in non-exempt functions, but the powers had not been exercised.
In a later decision the Tax Court held that when the trust instrument
specifically provides that the purpose of the trust is charitable, the
court can assume that the trustees will not exercise any other authorized
powers if such powers would violate the overall charitable purpose23
Contrary to the above line of thought, the Second Circuit rejected
the argument that a trustee of an allegedly exempt trust was only
empowered, and not required, to draft legislation to effect the purposes
of the trust. These purposes included the abolition of capitalism and
the advancement of civil liberties. The court felt that they could be
accomplished only by legislation and were in themselves political and
therefore non-exempt. 24
Thus, it is not entirely certain that the organizational test will be
overlooked. Many courts quote it in toto without comment. At a
minimum, a court must be convinced that the undesirable powers will
not be exercised before the test will be disregarded. On the other hand,
the organizational test will generally not present insurmountable prob-
lems to an operating hospital. With regard to future earnings, any
deficiency in the corporate charter can be cured by amendment. Trou-
ble will therefore primarily arise when an exemption for income earned
in previous taxable years is disallowed, as charter amendments will not
have retroactive effect.
LIMITATIONS ON THE OPERATIONAL TEST
At one time the Commissioner of Internal Revenue [Com-
missioner] contended that the conduct of a business by a charitable
institution violated the requirement of exclusive operation for exempt
22. 32 T.C. 469 (1959), af'd, 284 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1960). See also Elisian
Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1969).
23. Waller v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 665, 673 (1963).
24. Marshall v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1945).
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purposes. In Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores,25 however,
the United States Supreme Court held that commercial trading by a
charity is permissible if it is incidental to the pursuit of the exempt
purpose. The expenditure of the income rather than its production is
therefore the focal point.2"
Today the regulations recognize this distinction and incorporate it
into the organizational test.27  The basic problem in its application is
the determination of whether the primary purpose of the organization is
to engage in the trade or business or to further its charitable purposes.28
If the trade or business is undertaken in pursuit of the exempt purposes,
the exemption is valid. This determination is a factual one in which the
size and extent of the commercial business is contrasted with that of the
exempt activities. 29  Courts generally employ a monetary test, compar-
ing sales collected in the trade with amounts expended on the charitable
programs. A large accumulation of profits is fatal to the exemption. 30
For most operating health care institutions, these :requirements
provide no insurmountable obstacle. While the operation of a hospital
does constitute a trade or business, this enterprise is inseparable from
the performance of its exempt function.3 ' Of course, no hospital should
accumulate vast amounts of profits, unless they are used in expanding
facilities and improving health care.32
Notwithstanding the incidental status of the business, the Supreme
Court in Trinidad recognized the possibility of an unfair competitive
advantage enjoyed by charities over their non-exempt commercial ri-
25. 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
26. Id. at 581. See also St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427
(8th Cir. 1967); Stevens Bros. Foundation v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 633, 638 (8th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 969 (1964); Passaic United Hebrew Burial Ass'n v. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 500, 505 (D.NJ. 1963); Lewis v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 950
(D. Wyo. 1961).
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1959); id. -1(e) (1967).
28. Id. -1(e) (1967).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1969);
People's Educ. Camp Soe'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964); Passaic
United Hebrew Burial Ass'n v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 500 (D.N.J. 1963); Scripture
Press Foundation v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
985 (1962); Edward Orten, Jr., Ceramic Foundation, 56 T.C. 147 (1971).
31. Davis Hosp., Inc., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 45,097 at 45-344 (1945); Goldsby
King Memorial Hosp., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 44,233 at 44-757 (1944); Rev. Rul. 56-185,
1956-1 Com. BULL. 202. For purposes of this discussion, the reader may assume that
the exempt function of hospitals is the provision of health care coupled with some degree
of charitable aid to indigent patients. For a full discussion of the exempt function of a
hospital, see text accompanying notes 43-85 infra.
32. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. at 203.
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vals. 3 Exempt organizations could expand operations with tax-free
profits, while their competitors could not. As a remedy, Congress
enacted a tax on profits derived by charities in commercial transac-
tions. 4 With certain exceptions, section 511 imposes an income tax on
the "unrelated business taxable income" of section 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions, including health care institutions.35 Section 512 defines "unrelat-
ed business taxable income" as the gross income from an "unrelated
trade or business" regularly conducted by the charity, less deductions for
expenses connected with the trade or business. 6 An "unrelated trade
or business" is one whose operation is not substantially related to the
performance of the charity's exempt function. The mere need for
income to support the charitable activities is not a substantial connec-
tion. 37
These sections mean that when a hospital generates income from
the furnishing of health care to its own patients, no tax will be imposed,
because the income is clearly related to the exempt functions. 8 How-
ever, the income from services rendered to others on a continuous basis
will be subject to the tax.3" For example, if a hospital maintains a
pharmacy that regularly sells prescription drugs to the general public,
the income will constitute "unrelated business taxable income."40 If
such sales occur infrequently as a courtesy to the private patients of its
medical staff, there is no regularly conducted unrelated business and
thus no tax.41 Furthermore, many services not directly connected with
health care, but necessary for the operation of a hospital, are not
"unrelated businesses" if provided solely for patients, employees, and
visitors. These activities include the operation of a cafeteria, a gift
shop, and a parking lot. The Commissioner has determined that there
is a sufficient relationship between the furnishing of these services and
the provision of health care to prevent the imposition of a tax.42
33. See 263 U.S. at 582.
34. See 6 J. MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.14a, at 84-85
(1975); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1975).
35. See INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 511.
36. Id. § 512. This definition is subject to modifications specified in section
512(b).
37. Id. § 313(a).
38. See id.; Rev. Rul. 68-376, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 246.
39. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 513.
40. Rev. Rul. 68-375, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 245; Rev. Rul. 68-374, 1968-2 CuM.
BULL. 242.
41. Rev. Rul. 68-374, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 242.
42. See Rev. Ruls. 69-267 to -269; 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 160. See also Rev. Rul. 69-
463, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 131.
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REQUISITES OF AN EXEMPT FUNCTION
Section 501(c)(3) lists the following purposes as qualifying for
exemption: religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, educational, and prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
43
Further, the section provides that the organization must serve a public
and not a private interest in the attainment of these goals.44
A health care institution must qualify, if at all, as a charitable
organization. 45 The regulations provide that the term "charitable" is to
be interpreted according to its "generally accepted legal sense. ' 46 Ac-
cording to the regulations, this meaning embraces "[rielief of the poor
and distressed"; promotion of religion, education, or science; construc-
tion of public buildings, monuments, or works; "lessening of the bur-
dens of Government;" and advancement of social welfare.47 The provi-
sion of health care is not specifically included. In granting charitable
status, the Internal Revenue Service [IRS] has traditionally required that
hospitals do more than just generally provide health care.
Prior to 1956, the IRS contended that exemption as a charitable
organization should be denied when a hospital charged for its services.
Even financially solvent patients had to be provided free care for the
hospital to qualify under 501 (c) (3). Clearly, the cost of patient treat-
ment could not be met today through governmental grants and private
donations alone. To require hospitals to furnish all care without charge
would render impossible the charitable services they presently perform.
Quite correctly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit and the Tax Court both rejected this position.48  At the same time,
these courts noted that exempt status required admission and treatment
of those unable to pay.49
In a 1956 revenue ruling,"0 the IRS enunciated the requirements
that a hospital must meet to constitute a public charitable organization.
Such classification, according to the IRS, "contemplate[d] an implied
43. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 501 (c) (3). See note 8 supra for text.
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (1959).
45. Id. -1(d)(1)(ii); see note 9 supra.
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959).
47. Id.
48. Commissioner v. Battle Creek, Inc., 126 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942); Davis
Hosp., Inc., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 45,097 at 45-344 (1945).
49. Commissioner v. Battle Creek, Inc., 126 F.2d at 406; Davis Hosp., Inc., P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 45,097 at 45-348 (1945).
50. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 202.
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public trust constituted for some public benefit.""' To qualify, the
institution first had to be "organized as a non-profit charitable organiza-
tion for the purpose of operating a hospital for the care of the sick."
Secondly, "to the extent of its financial ability," the hospital had to
provide services free of charge to indigents.52 At the same time, it was
allowed to charge those able to pay. A relatively low charity record was
acceptable "in the absence of charitable demands of the community,""'
and charity could be rendered by providing services at reduced rates.
The generation of profits and their use in improving hospital facilities
were also considered proper. However, mere acquiescence by the hos-
pital in the failure of some patients to pay for services rendered was
insufficient charitable activity, if the hospital operated with the expecta-
tion of full payment by all patients.54
In Robert C. Olney,55 a 1958 case, the Tax Court held that the
hospital in question was exempt from taxation since it conformed to the
dictates of the above ruling. The court found that the hospital had not
denied treatment to any patient because of his indigency and that no
investigation was made concerning a patient's ability to pay upon appli-
cation for admission. On the contrary, the court found that many were
admitted with the hospital's knowledge of their indigency.50
Later the Tax Court cited the 1956 revenue ruling in denying tax
exemptions. Holding that the mere operation of a hospital did not
automatically constitute a charitable activity, the court in Sonora Com-
munity Hospital5J 7 held that the provision of gratuitous services to im-
poverished patients was a necessary supplement.5 s The court declared
that the hospital had failed to hold itself out to the public as a charitable
institution and had rendered free care on a de minimis level-less than
one percent of compensated care.59 Again, the court in Maynard
Hospital, Inc.,60 in denying an exemption, noted the low amount of
work performed without remuneration. The fact that the hospital did
not refuse admission to indigents and often cancelled unpaid bills was
51. Id. at 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 203.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 204.
54. Id. at 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 203.
55. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 58,200 at 58-849 (1958).
56. Id. at 58-855.
57. 46 T.C. 519 (1966), afj'd per curiam, 397 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1968).
58. Id. at 525-26.
59. Id. at 526.
60. 52 T.C. 1006 (1969).
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not sufficient, as the court found that the institution expected compensa-
tion for all services. 6
In 1969 there was a dramatic shift in the position of the IRS.
Many hospital representatives had claimed that they should be classified
in the same manner as educational and scientific organizations, that is,
as charitable institutions, regardless of their philanthropic performance.
In response, Revenue Ruling 69-545 was issued. It allowed an exemp-
tion if the articles of organization of a hospital limited the institution
to charitable purposes, if the hospital operated a full-time emergency
room that was available to all requiring emergency care without regard
to ability to pay, and if it provided health services to those able to pay
(including Medicare patients). If these criteria were met, a hospital
was to be viewed as charitable, even though it ordinarily limited its
admissions to financially solvent patients or Medicare recipients and
referred others to community hospitals that peformed gratuitous serv-
ices. 2
Thus, with minor qualification, the IRS finally agreed that the
promotion of health was per se a charitable purpose and should be
deemed beneficial for the entire community, even if certain segments of
the community such as indigents were excluded. By operating an
emergency room open to all, by providing health services to those able
to pay, and by treating Medicare and Medicaid patients, a hospital was
considered to be promoting the health of a class of persons that was
"broad enough to benefit the community." '63
In 1974 a Kentucky welfare organization sought to prevent the use
of Revenue Ruling 69-545 in qualifying hospitals as charities. It
contended that the failure of the new ruling to require treatment of
indigents was contrary to congressional intent and to relevant judicial,
legislative, and administrative history on the matter. In Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit rejected these contentions and upheld
the 1969 ruling."4
According to the court, the word "charitable," as used in the
Treasury regulations, permitted a definition far broader than mere aid to
indigent members of society. The concept of health care was included
61. Id. at 1026-27.
62. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 CuM. BuLL. 117, 118.
63. Id. at 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 118.
64. 506 F.2d 1278 (1974). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the
district court, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing. 44 U.S.L.W. 4724 (U.S. June 1,
1976).
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within the definition. 8  While hospitals were once "almshouses sup-
ported by philanthropy providing care primarily for the poor," the
soaring costs of medical care and the growing use of hospitals by all
segments of society had radically changed the nature of the institution.
Futhermore, the growth of Medicare and Medicaid had eliminated the
requirement of much of the populace for free hospitalization. 0
The court noted that under the 1956 ruling, which required the
rendering of free services only to the extent of a hospital's financial
ability, a hospital operating at a deficit had no obligation to the poor.
The 1969 ruling, however, required a hospital to provide services to
indigents in the form of free emergency care; this requirement was
without qualification. Also, the 1969 ruling required the acceptance of
Medicare and Medicaid patients to obtain exempt status. On these
bases, the court suggested that the 1969 ruling provided greater benefit
to the poor than did its predecessor. 67  It concluded the ruling was a
proper interpretation of the term "charitable" as used in section
501 (c)(3) and the regulations. 68
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case but failed to
reach the question 'of the validity of Revenue Ruling 69-545.09 Thus,
this issue is yet to be resolved. However, a subsequent opinion by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has questioned
whether mere compliance with the 1969 Revenue Ruling will be suffi-
cient to obtain a tax exemption. 70 In Harding Hospital, Inc. v. United
States,7 ' the denial of an exemption was based upon the failure of the
hospital to hold itself out to the public as a charitable institution, the
lack of public donations to the hospital, and the failure of the hospital to
establish a specific plan or policy for the treatment of charity patients. 72
Although uncompensated services ranged between four and almost
eight percent of its revenue, the hospital treated patients as charitable
cases only after their funds were exhausted. 73
Theopinion does not indicate whether there was emergency room
service for all persons regardless of financial status, but the type of
65. Id. at 1287, citing RE.STAT MNT (SECOND) oF TRUSm § 368 (1959); 4 A.
ScowT, THm LAw OF TRUSTS § 368 (3d ed. 1967).
66. 506 F.2d at 1288.
67. Id. at 1289.
68. Id. at 1290.
69. See note 64 supra.
70. Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974).
71. Id.




psychiatric treatment exclusively rendered by the hospital implied that
an emergency facility was not necessary for medical purposes. 74 Thus,
it is not clear that the failure to establish a specific plan or policy for the
treatment of charity patients would constitute a ground for a denial of a
section 501(c)(3) exemption when an emergency room is provided.
The court specifically declined to determine whether emergency treat-
ment alone is sufficient. 7 ,
It should be noted that the court did not rule on the validity of the
1969 ruling but assumed that its validity would not alter its holding.76
Yet Revenue Ruling 69-545 does not require any specific plan beyond
the furnishing of emergency services to indigents, a service probably not
required for medical reasons in this instance. Rather than reconcile the
above confusion, the opinion discussed two other psychiatric institutions
that operated a community health center and a ghetto clinic, both of
which rendered gratuitous care to indigents. The court felt that these
clinics satisfied its requirement of a specific plan.7 7  Such a require-
ment, totally unrelated to the treatment method of Harding Hospital,
would be an unjustifiable financial burden to that institution, consider-
ing the policy behind Revenue Ruling 69-545.
Consequently it is not entirely clear to what extent free medical
services must be provided or how important the provision of free
services is as a single factor in determining exemptions under section
501(c)(3). Certainly, other tests, such as prohibition of private bene-
fit from the revenues of the hospital, must be met.78  Probably, as the
possibility of private utilization becomes increasingly suspicious, the
more stringently indigent services may be scrutinized to determine
whether the hospital serves a public function. As to what amount of
free hospitalization must be provided, free emergency care is a mini-
mum. When this care is not required by the specialized medical pursuits
of the hospital, some specific plan for poor relief may be required as a
substitute. The opinion in Harding Hospital also indicates there may be
a further obligation for the hospital to represent itself to the public as a
charitable organization for the purposes of receiving donations and
74. See id. at 1070. The hospital treated mental and nervous diseases by a method
known as milieu therapy. Under this treatment, the total environment of the patient is
continually controlled with the goal of rehabilitation. Id.
75. Id. at 1078 n.2.
76. Id. at 1076.
77. Id. at 1077-78.
78. See text accompanying notes 80-105 infra.
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advertising the free services provided.79
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE BENEFIT
Section 501(c)(3) requires that no part of the earnings of an
exempt organization inure to the benefit of private persons.8 0 The
regulations further require that the assets of an organization be dedi-
cated to an exempt purpose. Thus, its articles must require that upon
dissolution of the organization the assets be distributed for exempt
purposes, and must prevent any part of them from reverting to private
individuals."' There is an absolute prohibition of any private enrich-
ment derived from the earnings.
Furthermore, the regulations require that an organization serve a
public rather than a private interest.8 2 In this requirement there is more
leeway. Unlike the total prohibition against private receipt of earnings,
the directive of public benefit does allow some form of private better-
ment under limited circumstances. First, the benefit must flow princi-
pally to the public. The private benefit must be relatively small and
incidental to or inseparable from the public benefit. Next, the presence
of private benefit must create no conceivable threat of detriment to the
public's interest."3
Thus, tax benefits to the creator of a charity may be permissible
even though they are derived from dealings between the creator and the
charity. In Revenue Ruling 69-39,84 the creator sold securities to a
charitable trust at an amount equal to his cost. The fair market value of
the stock exceeded its cost, and the trust resold the stock at a profit. The
creator then took a charitable deduction for the difference between the
79. 505 F.2d at 1077.
80. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3). See note 8 supra for the text of the
section.
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(b)(4) (1969).82. Id. -1(d) (1)(ii).
83. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 Cum. BuLL. 128 (exemption upheld when
improvements to lake by exempt organization benefited its donors as well as the public.
The donors were lake front property owners, but the lake was used primarily by the
public.); Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 47 (1966) (exemption denied on facts simi-
lar to those in Rev. Rul. 70-186. In this case the improved waterway was used almost
entirely by the donors of the exempt organization.); Rev. Rul. 66-358, 1966-2 CuM.
BuLL. 218 (exemption permitted when corporation donated land which was run by the
exempt organization as a public park. The corporation retained the right to use a scene
in the park as its brand symbol. The Commissioner viewed the benefit to the
corporation as incidental to that received by the general public.). See also cases cited
note 85 infra (tax benefits to private individuals).
84. 1969-1 Cum. BuLL. 148.
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fair market value and the cost of the stock. These transactions were
held permissible, since the creation of the charitable deduction was not
the primary function of the charity, and there was no risk of investment
loss to the charity. 5
An exemption, however, will be denied if formation of the organi-
zation is fundamentally an attempt to reduce the federal income taxes of
its creator. In Revenue Ruling 69-266,86 a doctor formed an allegedly
charitable organization whose activities consisted of treating patients for
compensation. Its creator was employed to provide these services in
return for an adequate salary and rather desirable fringe benefits. The
Commissioner correctly observed that the organization did not signifi-
cantly differ from the private practice of medicine. 87
For hospitals, problems with the prohibition of benefit to private
persons have primarily involved hospital income and restricted staff
memberships. 8 The first involves the channeling of hospital income to
founding or managing doctors. One method is the payment of exces-
sive salaries. This device is specifically prohibited by Revenue Ruling
56-185.89 However, the payment of compensation for services rendered
by doctors should not be fatal if the amounts are reasonable 0 The
determination of this question of fact depends upon the qualifications of
the officer or doctor, the nature of the service rendered, the responsibili-
ties of the position assumed, and the remuneration paid by competitors
for comparable positions. 1 The burden of proof is upon the charity 2
If the salary is paid to a doctor who founds or manages the
hospital, there is very close scrutiny of the transaction. Misappropria-
tion of a hospital's funds by its creator for his personal expenses, as in
85. Id.; see, e.g., Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121, 125-26 (1st
Cir. 1969); Commissioner v. Teich, 407 F.2d 815, 816 (7th Cir. 1969); Waller v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. at 676-77.
86. 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 151.
87. Id.
88. Section 503 denies exemptions to organizations engaging in certain prohibited
transactions that result in private benefit. Hospitals are, however, exempted from these
restrictions by section 503(b)(5). INT. REv. CODE OF 1954. At the same time,
hospitals remain subject to all other restrictions on private benefit. Kenner v. Commis-
sioner, 318 F.2d 632, 635-36 (7th Cir. 1963).
89. 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 202, 203; accord, Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States,
203 F.2d 872, 876 (5th Cir. 1953).
90. See Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ala. 1946).
91. See Jones Bros. Bakery, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.2d 1282, 1291 (Ct. Cf.
1969).
92. Kenner v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1963).
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Kenner v. Commissioner,"' is a clear violation of section 501 (c) (3).
Also, payment of salaries that are determined as a percentage of hospital
or laboratory receipts is highly suspect. If the amounts paid are large, it
will be difficult to establish that medical services of equal value were
rendered.9 4 In the Commissioner's view, such methods of compensa-
tion may render the primary purpose of the hospital a joint business
venture between the hospital and the physicians in control rather than
the rendering of health care.95 On the other hand, if such a compensa-
tion agreement is determined after arm's length negotiations between a
doctor and an independent hospital, the result may differ-provided
that the payments are not excessive. 96
Sometimes large payments for hospital surpervision to doctors who
are closely related with the establishment or control of the institution are
considered a private benefit, even if comparable services were rendered.
In Harding Hospital the court concluded that compensation for hospital
supervision paid to a medical partnership (which also provided all of the
institution's medical care) was an instance of private benefit. 7  The
hospital had contended the expenditure was in lieu of employing a
salaried medical doctor. Although the court assumed that the expendi-
ture was valid, it still believed the medical partnership received substan-
tial benefit from the agreement.98 On the whole, this conclusion ap-
pears incorrect, if the court actually believed that adequate services were
provided. If mere employment of a doctor in control of the hospital
will be regarded as an impermissible instance of private benefit, small
hospitals may have the burden of employing unnecessary personnel.
Certain business transactions between -the controlling doctors and
the hospital may void the exemption. In Maynard Hospital, Inc.,9 a
pharmacy owned by the hospital was transferred to a corporation owned
by the trustees of the hospital. The pharmacy bought drugs under the
hospital's name, thereby obtaining purchase discounts, and then sold the
drugs to the hospital at a price ten percent greater than the hospital
could have obtained by purchasing directly. The court properly found
this device to be a method of channeling hospital revenues to its
93. Id. at 634-35.
94. Cf. Sonora Community Hosp. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 519, 526-27 (1966).
95. Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 113.
96. Id.
97. 505 F.2d at 1078.
98. Id.
99. 52 T.C. 1006 (1969).
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trustees.10 Rental of office space, equipment, and business office
services at less than fair market value by the hospital to its medical staff
is also considered to be operation for the benefit of private individu-
als.101
A hospital is also prohibited from restricting the use of its facilities
to a limited group of physicians. 102 This practice is perceived by the
Commissioner as a violation of the "public service concept inherent in
section 501(c)(3)." °3 The facilities of a charitable institution should
be open to the community. Subject to space limitations, all local
doctors should be allowed use of the facilities. Restricted use also
creates an advantageous economic interest in the staff doctors. Even in
a case in which staff membership was open to any physician who wished
to practice at the hospital,' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that there was private benefit because ninety to ninety-five percent of the
treatment at the hospital was performed by a medical corporation whose
membership was restricted. The corporation was viewed to have sub-
stantial benefit merely because of its "virtual monopoly" of the hospital's
patients.' 05
PROHIBITION OF POLITICAL ACTVITY
Since 1954 the Internal Revenue Code has enjoined exempt organ-
izations from devoting a "substantial" portion of their activities to the
dissemination of "propaganda," from "otherwise attempting to influence
legislation," and from participating in a political campaign for public
office on behalf of any candidate.106 The proscription of propaganda
and legislative influence was added by the Revenue Act of 19 3 4107 as a
congressional response to a Second Circuit opinion written by Judge
100. Id. at 1028-29.
101. Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1078 (6th Cir. 1974);
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 117, 118; Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 CuM. BULL.
202, 203.
102. Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1078 (6th Cir. 1974);
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 117, 118; Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 Cum. BULL.
202, 203.
103. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 202, 203.
104. Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 805, 813-14 (S.D. Ohio
1973), aff'd, 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974).
105. 505 F.2d at 1078.
106. INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3). See note 8 supra for the text of the
subsection.
107. Ch. 216, § 101, 48 Stat. 680, 700.
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Learned Hand.108 In this case, Slee v. Commissioner,'"0 an exemption
was denied the American Birth Control League. The League main-
tained a clinic in New York City, where it aided married women in
preventing conception. But the League also agitated for the repeal and
amendment of state and federal statutes dealing with birth control.
While the operation of the clinic was a charitable activity, the court
ruled that because of its legislative activity, the League was not organ-
ized and operated exclusively for exempt puposes, and thus did not
qualify as "charitable" under the statute. 110
The statutory enactment of the Slee doctrine in section 501(c)(3)
has created several new issues. First, what is "substantial" activity? The
Slee opinion did not condone even the most minute amount of legislative
activity. 1 The only court ruling since the codification held that five
percent is not substantial.112 Secondly, what does "propaganda" or
otherwise influencing legislation mean? Judge Hand distinguished be-
tween education (which is exempt) and the attempt to secure the
acceptance of beliefs by the public (which, constituting propagandizing,
is not exempt). 13 The opinion in Seasongood v. Commissioner"4
discussed the divers sentiments on the issue held by the various members
of the Sixth Circuit. The author of the opinion felt that propaganda is
communication that has a harmful, selfish purpose and is inaccurate or
biased in a manner calculated to achieve such purposes. Other mem-
bers believed that mere dissemination of a particular belief or opinion in
an attempt to influence public opinion is sufficient to constitute propa-
ganda." 5 The latter definition appears to be the majority approach.1 '
It would then follow that the prohibition applies to attempts to influ-
ence legislation indirectly by molding public opinion, as well as directly
108. Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930). See Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 512 (1959).
109. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
110: Id. at 185.
111. Id.
112. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
113. 42 F.2d at 185.
114. 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
115. Id. at 909-11.
116. See, e.g., Christian Echoes Natl Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,
854 (10th Cir. 1972) (motive for engaging in propaganda is immaterial); League of
Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822
(1960); Note, The Sierra Club Controversy, 55 CALIw. L. Ray. 618 (1967); cf., e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 74-117, 1974-1 CuM. Bum. 128; Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 125.
But see League of Women Voters, supra, at 384 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
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by lobbying." 7  Thirdly, what acts constitute influencing legislation?
In League of Women Voters v. United States,"8 the League contacted
legislators and public officials to promote the political goals adopted in
its annual platform. This platform was the result of deliberations of
members at the local, state, and national levels of the League. While
the court found that very little effort went into actual correspondence
with legislators, it still ruled that the organization was not operated for
exempt purposes because of substantial political activity. Within the
definition of lobbying, the court included the deliberation on and adop-
tion of the platform, both before and at the national convention at which
it was adopted. These activities, of course, accounted for a significant
portion of the League's travail."19
Slee, however, distinguished legislative activity that was ancillary to
the charitable purpose which remained the exclusive goal. -' 0 As exam-
ples, Judge Hand cited lobbying for appropriations by a state university,
lobbying for legislation granting a special charter needed for certain
charitable purposes, or lobbying for permission to teach evolutionary
biology in Tennessee by a university of that state.' 2' A number of
courts have relied upon this ancillary activity dictum to justify a permis-
sive standard.12 2
This approach, however, is a very treacherous foundation upon
which to build a tax exemption. Too often the doctrine has been
utilized by judges primarily as a boilerplate to justify their foregone
conclusions based upon their own subjective standards. It seems that
the doctrine will appear in an opinibn only when the legislative goals of
the organizations are in public favor.' 28  Lord's Day Alliance v. United
117. See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 504-05 (1959); Christian
Echoes Nat'l Ministry Inc., v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir. 1972);
American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1953);
Roberts Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1952).
118. 180F. Supp. 379 (Ct. C1. 1960).
119. Id. at 383.
120. 42 F.2d at 185.
121. Id.
122. See Note, The Revenue Code and a Charity's Politics, 73 YiiaE L.I. 661, 667
n.25 (1964).
123. Cf., e.g., -International Reform Fed'n v. District Unemployment Compensation
Bd., 131 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (exemption upheld when organization sponsored
legislation for prohibition of gambling, prostitution, harmful drugs and alcohol, etc.);
Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1941) (exemption upheld
when objects of organization included passage of temperance legislation); Slee v.
Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930) (exemption denied when objects of organiza-
tion were to provide birth control methods to patients through its clinic and to modify
legislation restricting use of contraceptives); Lord's Day Alliance v. United States, 65 F.
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States24 and Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch 2 " serve as examples. In
the former case the allegedly exempt group was organized to promote
legislation to observe the Sabbath. In the latter, the goal of the organi-
zation was to enforce by litigation and legislation the separation of
church and state. As to the first group, a federal district court in
Pennsylvania viewed its purposes to be charitable and its legislative
attempts to be necessary and ancillary to the accomplishment of those
purposes. As to the second group, a district court in Massachusetts
ruled that its activities were political in nature and non-exempt. One
would think that the enforcement of the liberties of the United States
Constitution would be of sufficient public benefit to merit charitable
status. All Americans have an interest in those liberties. All do not
have a stake in Sunday blue laws. Nor does it appear that recourse to
political coercion is less critical to the prevention of mandatory prayer in
the public schools than to the prevention of commercial activity on
Sunday. In other cases, the exemptions have been upheld under the
Slee dictum for organizations seeking passage of legislation prohibiting
gambling, prostitution, harmful drugs, and liquor.'2" But the Slee case
itself denied an exemption when the American Birth Control League
sought to liberalize laws restricting the use of birth control devices. In
this case, Judge Hand ruled that this activity was not ancillary to the
operation of the clinic that dispensed contraceptives; yet, the purpose of
the legal activity was to enlarge the conditions under which contracep-
tives could be prescribed. Although not conclusive proof, these cases
illustrate the flexibility of the dictum, which can operate as a potential
source of judicial discrimination.
As a general rule, the prohibition of political activity does not
obstruct the proper management of hospitals. Unlike many educational
groups, a hospital is apolitical in nature. However, there are many
instances in which hospital authorities will perceive that their institu-
tions' interests are involved in or threatened by legislative proposals or
judicial decisions. These instances could include legislation limiting
recoveries in medical malpractice suits, regulating the operation of
hospitals, relating to abortion or euthanasia, or establishing national
Supp. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (exemption upheld when organization sponsored legislation to
protect the Sabbath); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch, 25 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1938)
(exemption denied when goal of organization was to enforce constitutional separation of
church and state through litigation and legislation).
124. 65 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
125. 25 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1938).
126. See note 123 supra.
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hospitalization insurance. Involvement by a hospital in the enactment
process of any of the above legislation could seriously endanger its
exemption. At the least it would raise such questions as whether the
involvement was substantial activity or whether it was ancillary to the
institution's exempt purpose. At present, the practice is for a hospital
to belong to a national and a state association that obtain a consensus of
opinion from their member hospitals on any given issue and present
these views to the applicable legislative body. Thus, the institution itself
is never involved in the lobbying.127 It is also permissible for an official
of a hospital to appear and testify before a legislative committee, if such
testimony is given at the request of that committee.128
Section 501(c)(3) also contains an absolute prohibition of in-
volvement in a campaign for political office on behalf of a candidate.1 2 9
Suffice it to say, any hospital that becomes openly involved in a political
campaign has signed the death warrant of its tax exemption.
CONCLUSION
By this point, the omnipotent effect of the tax laws upon the
operation of a hospital should be obvious. In summary, the major
problems for hospitals seeking exempt status include tailoring the activi-
ties of the institution to comply with the legal definition of an exempt
function and avoiding the aggrandizement of private individuals from
the operation of the institution.
The pervasiveness of the influence possessed by the tax statutes
upon charities raises a very fundamental question: should the tax laws
be used to implement public policy unrelated to the collection of govern-
mental revenues? The problem is that taxation requirements and con-
siderations may significantly affect and alter the development of an
independent area of the law. Development of the concept of charity
should not be restricted by decisions necessary to prevent tax evasion.
The political prohibitions placed upon charities are understandable only
within the framework of the national tax scheme. For example, politi-
cal activism is not incompatible with the concept of charity. The evil is
the financing of political activity by governmental subsidy. Ideally, a
charity should use the political process to foster its goals. As to the
127. Telephone interview with Paul Scopac, Ass't Administrator of Patient Services,
Duke Hospital, Durham, N.C., Feb. 28, 1976.
128. Rev. Rul. 70-449, 1970-2 CUM. BULL. 111.
129. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (3). See note 8 supra for text.
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